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MULTIPLE LOGS ANALYSIS FOR DETECTING 
ZERO-DAY BACKDOOR TROJANS 
 
SINCHAI CARAVUT 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Trojan horses commonly known as “Trojans” are the computer threats that have 
been recently causing trouble on the internet because of their new propagation 
techniques. Social engineering has become a popular strategy to deceive people to run the 
attacker’s malicious programs. Trojans use this technique to propagate themselves from a 
computer or a network to others, thus making them hard to prevent. The only way to keep 
computers and networks safe from them is by detecting them as soon as possible. 
Because of their quiet behavior, it’s hard to detect by only IDS (Intrusion Detection 
System) log analysis; therefore, multiple log analysis is presented for detecting zero-day 
Trojans. Since there are many kinds of Trojans nowadays, for the first phase we will only 
concentrate on zero-day backdoor Trojans. 
 Basically, IDS logs, connection logs, process activity logs and system logs are 
considered for monitoring user activities and traffic behavior. We make the list of process 
activities from studying the behavior of many kinds of backdoor Trojans. For example, 
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most backdoor Trojans are downloaded from suspicious websites, which can be revealed 
from IDS logs and connection logs. Next, process activity logs and system logs can 
monitor applications’ behavior when users try to install backdoor Trojans such as 
opening unusual ports, hiding processes, modifying the registry for auto-startup, or 
disabling antivirus services. We look closer at IDS logs if infected machines try to 
connect to remote IRC servers for sending information every time they start or close or if 
they generate anomalous traffic such as port scanning or DDos (Distributed Denial of 
Service) used to attack neighbors. Because of thorough examination, multiple log 
analysis can create a powerful and accurate alarm for detecting zero-day backdoor 
Trojans. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A Trojan horse or Trojan is a program that behaves like a normal program but, 
behind the scenes, it runs some malicious work. There are many types of Trojans, all of 
which have differences in behavior and level of severity. One of the most dangerous 
types of Trojans is the backdoor Trojan because compromised machines will be fully 
controlled by attackers as if they are administrators of those machines. Moreover, it can 
raise other harmful activities to neighbors such as unauthorized access, DDoS, and 
network scanning. When a backdoor Trojan is installed on a machine, it uses some 
technique to hide itself and opens communication port(s) for attackers who want to 
remotely access the machine at that time or later.  
Trojans have been a danger for a long time and are still present in the Internet 
world [1]. Social engineering is a popular approach to propagate them on people [1]. 
Attackers send a backdoor Trojan or a malicious URL to peoples’ mailboxes and disguise 
it as an interesting thing from someone who can be trusted. Once the targeted people run 
that Trojan or open the given URL, a Trojan will be installed on their machines silently. 
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Because of this stealthy process, it’s a difficult task for administrators to prevent and 
detect Trojans by only intrusion detection system (IDS) especially zero-day Trojans— 
Trojans unknown to the public. It implicitly means we don’t have their signatures, so 
signature-based IDS cannot recognize them. Even though we already have anomaly-
based IDS, which can detect malicious programs without using signature matching, this 
kind of IDS highly generates false positive alarms since the nature of network traffic and 
exploiting traffic are always changed. 
In this paper, I present a new approach to detect zero-day backdoor Trojans by 
using a Multiple Logs Analysis System (MLAS). MLAS considers IDS logs, connection 
logs, process activity logs, system logs and more for monitoring activities of processes 
and data traffic generated by these processes. I set the list of process activities for 
comparing detected activities with backdoor Trojans and give weight for each of them. 
The list of process activities is set from investigating many backdoor Trojans’ behavior 
such as opening unusual ports, hiding processes and modifying registries. For example, 
when users access or download software from suspicious websites, the activities are 
logged into a connection log. Then MLAS checks those websites with online link 
scanners to see if they are malicious. Further, MLAS looks into machine logs— 
Windows event log and process activity log-- to find out what processes try to kill 
antivirus program or other system monitor tools and to detect more as mentioned in the 
list of process activities. Finally, MLAS look at the network intrusion detection system’s 
logs to check data traffic inside the network. It tries to detect any exploit generated by 
infected machines 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works and tools, 
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which are used in this work. More information about the Trojan horse is covered in 
section 3 including backdoor Trojan characteristics. Section 4 introduces MLAS 
architecture. The list of process activities, weight and event score are specified in section 
5. For the next section, MLAS application design and process flow will be technically 
explained. Implementation, experimental results and result analysis are reported in 
section 7. Finally, in section 8, we summarize this paper and discuss further work.
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CHAPTER II 
RELATED WORKS AND TOOLS 
 
 
LinkScanner Pro [2] is a product of Exploit Prevention Labs, which can analyze 
the website content and the embedded application behavior of given IP addresses or 
domain names. It checks not only inside the website but also URLs, to which the page 
can connect. LinkScanner Pro detects the malicious content, exploit software, social 
engineer or phishing with an up-to-date malware-definition database. It classifies 
websites into four categories. Each of them indicate the level of severity. MLAS uses 
these levels to score an activity in the weighting process. 
McAfee SiteAdvisor [3] is another link-check application, which contains the 
same functionalities as LinkScanner. This application builds an automated robot system 
to check whether websites contain malicious software, social engineer, phishing or a bad 
history. This information will be kept in its database and the application will rank them 
into 3 levels of harmfulness. MLAS converts these levels into a score of an activity. The 
reasons that MLAS uses more than one link scanner are to assure the information about 
the severity of website and to have a big malware-definition database. 
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Snort [4] is a widely used signature-based IDS, which can detect many attacks 
using pattern matching. It monitors all data traffic passed through a network and 
compares traffic behavior with signatures. If any traffic behavior matches with any 
signature inside a signature-definition database, it will generate alarms to administrators. 
MLAS get information from the alarms and send them into behavior detection processes 
for comparing process activities and scoring process activities. 
Project Lasso [5] is a Windows event log collector. It converts the event log from 
binary format to text format and sends it across a network via syslog-ng protocol (TCP) 
to a syslog server. In MLAS, we use only a feature of converting the event log to txt 
format. This log data will be sent to a database via the MLAS log management system. 
Project Lasso is an open source application developed by LogLogic Inc. 
Port Reporter [11] is an application used to record all connections created by 
processes on a local machine. The log file contains remote IPs, remote ports, local IPs, 
local ports and process names, which make a connection. This information is useful for 
the Behavior Comparing System to compare traffic activities if it meets one in the list of 
process activities. Also, the remote IPs are sent to the Link Check System for examining 
the dangers of remote servers. 
Sophos Anti-Rootkit [12] is a rootkit scanner. It can detect and clean up hidden 
processes, hidden registries and hidden files in machines. Some Trojans use rootkit 
techniques to conceal themselves and Windows cannot see them without using special 
tool. Sophos Anti-Rootkit was introduced to find these hidden objects and send the object 
names to MLAS. Sophos Anti-Rootkit is a freeware developed by Sophos Inc. 
For a database server, MLAS uses Oracle [13] -- the popular relational database 
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management system product in the market. Oracle provides thin-client JDBC for Java, 
thus making it easy for Java development. Also, Snort has an interface communicating 
with Oracle in order to keep log data into the database. The version we used in MLAS is 
Oracle10gXE database server and client. 
System safety monitor (SSM) [14] is a system monitor application. It monitors 
process activities, inter-process activities, DLL injection, low level access of hardware, 
etc. SSM allows user to create rules for controlling processes when they try to access 
resources of other processes, or to start or to terminate processes. MLAS use this 
application to detect keyloggers, DLL injection and process termination.  
These powerful applications provide useful data to MLAS to detect processes run 
by backdoor Trojans. Port Reporter records all connections created by processes on a 
local machine and sends remote IPs to LinkScanner Pro and McAfee SiteAdvisor to 
check their content. Any anomalous network traffic will be captured by Snort. All 
process activities can be found in Lasso logs and System Safety Monitor logs. For hidden 
objects, MLAS uses Sophos Anti-Rootkit to find them. Log data and results are kept in 
an Oracle database. For the next section, I will discuss how processes work together and 
what the architecture of MLAS is. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TROJAN HORSE 
 
 
The word “Trojan horse” came from the story of the Trojan War. The war 
happened when the Greeks wanted to penetrate through the walls of Troy, which had 
been surrounded by many troops. The Greeks made a huge horse as a sign of 
peacefulness and gave this gift to Troy, but inside the horse, there were many Greek 
troops waiting to attack Troy. Troy accepted the gift and brought it into the city. After the 
city celebrated their peacefulness and became drunk, the Greek troops inside the horse 
went outside and opened the gate allowing other troops to take over the city [16]. 
In the computer security term, we use the name of the Trojan horse to name the 
malicious programs, which have characteristics like the Greeks’ horse. The Trojan is a 
malicious application, which pretends to be a legitimate application. When users install 
the Trojan, the hidden code will be installed as well. The backdoor Trojan is a kind of 
Trojans but it has some different characteristics, such as opening backdoor ports to the 
system. Attackers can access the system by creating a remote connection and controlling 
it to do many things (these kinds of Trojans are also called Remote Access Trojans 
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(RAT) [17]. For example, the common activities are  
• Using the system to be a mail relay and sending spam in order to propagate 
themselves or something else 
• Stealing users’ identity or private information such as credit card numbers, 
account numbers and SSN 
• Monitoring users’ activities 
• Attacking neighbor 
• Modifying machines’ object such as files, system registries and system log 
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How do the backdoor Trojans work? 
1. Attackers distribute Trojans in many ways such as spam email with an attached 
backdoor Trojan program 
 
Figure 1 An attacker distributes Trojan emails 
 
2. When users receive email and run the backdoor Trojan program, the Trojan will 
be installed on users’ machine, open backdoor port(s) and notify attacker via IRC, 
ICQ, MSN or email. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 A user receives a Trojan email, runs  
the Trojan program and notifies to the attacker 
 
ATTACKER 
DISTRIBUTE 
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ATTACKER 
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10  
3. Attackers can remotely connect to the infected machine and control it 
 
 
 
Figure 3 An infected machine opens a backdoor port so  
that the attacker can remotely connect to it to control it 
 
 
ATTACKER 
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Backdoor Trojans’ characteristics and activities [6], [7], [8], [9] 
1. propagates itself by  
• attaching Trojan’s executable files in spam emails. 
• sending Trojan’s executable files via Internet Relay Chat (IRC), MSN or ICQ. 
• exploiting an existing vulnerability or through an open port such as  
 The Microsoft SQL Server 2000 or MSDE 2000 Audit 
 The Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overrun 
Vulnerability 
 The Microsoft Windows Local Security Authority Service Remote Buffer 
Overflow  
• inserting its code in other files or programs. 
• enumerating all the shared drives and attempts to copy itself to the root folder 
of the shares. 
• downloading code to machines when they visit malicious or compromised 
web pages. 
• copying itself to the shared folders of some popular file-sharing networks such 
as Kazaa, Edonkey. 
2. consists of a server component and a client component. 
3. sends victim’s information via SMTP mail, IRC, ICQ pager, ICP Pager, Yahoo 
Messenger, AOL Instant Messenger, MSN Messenger, and a remote PHP page. 
4. contains its own SMTP engine for constructing outgoing messages. 
5. injects a companion backdoor dll into a system dll/exe process space such as 
csrss.exe, svchost.exe, iexplore.exe. This can avoid personal firewall detection. 
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6. launches the Internet Explorer process and attempt to access malicious web sites 
7. hides Trojan’s files and services using a rootkit. 
8. hides or unhide files, directories, keys, service names, or process names. 
9. sets the file attributes of the dropped files to SHR: System, Hidden and Read only. 
10. performs DoS attack. 
11. uses the XCP software to hide the copy of the Trojan files and the created registry 
subkeys. 
12. attempts to add the Trojan application as a trusted application into the firewall 
authorized application list or the Windows Firewall. 
13. connects to IRC servers to wait commands. 
14. normally distributes as a Win32 PE exe dropper that may be disguised as a JPG or 
BMP picture. 
15. attempts to obtain access to the password cache. 
16. a Trojan server process on victim machine make the connection to the client on 
port 80 using HTTP. In this way, it attempts to avoid personal firewall detection. 
17. attempts to SPAM others by searching for email addresses in the Windows 
Address Book, Internet Explorer's cache folder, and the %Temp% folder in order 
to spread the Trojan through email. 
18. creates a registry run key to load the Trojan processes at Windows startup. 
19. kills running processes such as Remote Access Connection Manager, Remote 
Procedure Call, Remote Procedure Call Service, DCOM. 
20. kills or disables firewall, antivirus programs, the windows update service and 
system monitoring tools. 
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21. decreases the security level. 
22. appends the local hosts file (in an attempt to disable updating of many AV 
products). For example,  
127.0.0.1 www.trendmicro.com 
127.0.0.1 www.symantec.com 
23. logs pressed keys when users type. 
24. captures browser window titles and keystrokes typed into Windows with the 
following strings such as bank, cash, login. 
25. clears CMOS. 
26. views the screen. 
27. causes Windows to shut down/reboot/log user off. 
28. opens unusual/unexpected ports on machine. 
29. manages the local file system. 
30. runs system commands via CMD.EXE (command is passed in via HTML form). 
31. inserts a script into HTML files on servers to give an individual with unauthorized 
full access to CMD.EXE. 
32. floods others to make networks slow down such as HTTP, ICMP, SYN, Ping, and 
UDP floods. 
33. redirects attempts to access spoofed web pages. 
34. adds new accounts. 
35. serves as a HTTP proxy or an SMTP relay. 
36. attempts to delete files generated by Trojans. 
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37. The following registry entry is added to install a BHO (Browser Helper Object) 
for generating extra pop-up ads, monitoring page navigation explorer 
38. turns on the victim's Webcam. 
39. adds configurable entry to the "load=" and "run=" lines in Win.ini, and "shell=" 
line of System.ini. 
40. schedules tasks to run Trojan’s processes. 
41. monitors the Internet Explorer for data submitted in web forms and log this 
information. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MLAS ARCHITECTURE 
 
 
The MLAS Architecture 
 
 
Figure 4 MLAS architecture 
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Log Management System (LMS) 
 
 
Figure 5 Log Management System 
 
The LMS manages log files received from many applications. The Log File 
Parsing Engine parses log files following a log file pattern. Then, the Data Storing Engine 
keeps this data in the database. 
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Link Check System (LCS) 
 
 
Figure 6 Link Check System 
The LCS checks URLs that user on target machine visited with link scanner 
agents outside MLAS. The Data Retrieving Engine retrieves URLs or remote IPs in the 
database. The Link Check Engine sends HTTP requests with parameter URLs to link 
scanner agents in order to check the level of harmfulness. When it receives responses, it 
sends this result to the Score Assignment Engine to assign score for each of URLs. 
Assigned scores will be stored in the database to be an input of the Weighting System. 
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Behavior Detection System (BDS) 
 
 
Figure 7 Behavior Detection System 
The BDS detects behavior of processes, which run on the target machine, to 
match with process activities in the list. Connection logs, system logs, process activity 
logs and others are retrieved by the Data Retrieving Engine. The Behavior Comparison 
Engine compares this information with process activities in the list and scores for each of 
the activities. Then, it sends the result to the Weighting System. The scores of the 
activities are assigned by the Score Assignment Engine. Results from this system will be 
stored in the database. 
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Weighting System (WS) 
 
 
Figure 8 Weighting System 
The WS makes the decision whether activities generated from the target machine 
are suspicious in that they might be infected by backdoor Trojans. The Weighting Engine 
receives the score from LCS and BDS and calculates weight of these data. If the total 
weight is more than the minimum weight that we set from experiments in the laboratory, 
MLAS assumes this machine is suspicious in that it might be infected by a backdoor 
Trojan; otherwise, it is not suspicious. Information about a suspicious machine is sent to 
the Report Generation System. 
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Report Generation System (RGS) 
 
 
Figure 9 Report Generation System 
The RGS generates reports to administrators. The Report Generation Engine 
receives information from WS and creates reports. The reports contain the total weight of 
every process run on the target machine and detail of process activities, which are met 
with process activities in the list. These reports will be sent to administrators by the 
Report Delivery Engine. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROCESS ACTIVITIES, WEIGHT AND EVENT SCORE 
 
 
Process activities and weight 
From the backdoor Trojans’ characteristics and activities, I chose the important 
events to create the list of process activities. Each process activity was assigned weight 
by level of severity, which can harm a system or a network. The first time, I assigned 
weight following an assumption on how dangerous these process activities can be. After 
many testing, the weight of some process activities was changed as mentioned in the 
result analysis (chapter VII). Finally, the process activities and their weight ended up 
following the table process activities and weight.  
 The weights ranged from 1 to 3. The higher value is the higher level of severity. 
Table I Weight and meaning 
Weight Meaning 
1 a general activity that is a part of backdoor behavior. 
2 a general activity that is a part of backdoor behavior and can generate 
serious situations to machines. 
3 a backdoor Trojan behavior. 
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Score 
 A score will be assigned to measure how close a detected event matches to a 
process activity in the list. The range of score is from 0 to 10. The maximum score value 
determines that the detected event is very close to the process activity in the list. Events 
that have the score 0 will be ignored and not be recoded. 
Table II Process activities and weight 
 Event Weight 
1 An application saves its files into %WinDir% or %SysDir% rather 
than %Program Files% 
 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
2 
2 An application adds its process into registry in part of automatic 
startup to run itself every time Windows start or copies the process 
into startup folder 
 
More detail: 
[Appendix A: 1. Startup registry keys and startup folder] 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
1 
3 An application tries to change the configuration of Windows 
monitor tools or a Windows update component in the registry. 
 
More detail: 
[Appendix A: 2. Windows monitor tools’ configuration registry 
keys] 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
2 
4 An application add some value into this registry to generate extra 
pop-up ads or monitor the navigation explorer page:  
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Win
dows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects 
 
More Detail: 
[appendix A: 3. Browser Helper Object] 
 Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
2 
5 An application tries to send machine’s information via SMTP 
mail, IRC, ICQ pager, ICP Pager, Yahoo Messenger, AOL Instant 
Messenger, MSN Messenger, and a remote PHP page. 
2 
23  
 
More Detail:  
[appendix A: 4. Ports and login servers for sending machine’s 
information] 
Detection:  
The Port reporter application’s log 
Snort’s log 
6 An application tries to inject DLLs into system DLLs/processes, 
such as csrss.exe, svchost.exe, iexplore.exe 
 
More Detail: 
[appendix A: 5. DLL injection] 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
2 
7 An application attempts to access malicious web sites while it’s 
installing or after installing 
 
Detection:  
The Port reporter application’s log 
3 
8 An application hides its files, directories, service names, or 
process names using rootkit 
 
More Detail: 
[appendix A: 6. Rootkit] 
Detection : 
The Sophos Anti-Rootkit application’s log 
2 
9 An application performs attacks to neighbors such as DoS attack, 
protocol floods, port scan. 
 
Detection:  
Snort’s log 
3 
10 An application connects to an IRC server for waiting command 
from an attacker. 
Detection:  
The Port reporter application’s log 
3 
11 An application attempts to access the password cache or any 
location where password information is contained. 
 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
3 
12 An application creates SMTP connection and sends many emails 
in order to spread itself through spam emails by searching for 
email addresses in Outlook’s Address Book. 
 
3 
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Detection : 
Windows Event Log-> security log 
The Port reporter application’s log 
13 An application tries to kill running system processes such as 
Remote Access Connection Manager, Remote Procedure Call, 
Remote Procedure Call Service, DCOM 
 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
2 
14 An application kills or disables system monitoring tools such as 
the Windows firewall, the Windows update service and antivirus 
programs, or it decreases the security level of that machine. 
 
Detection : 
The System safety monitor’s log 
3 
15 An application appends the local hosts file with any security 
websites to loop to a localhost ip. For example, it appends this line 
     “127.0.0.1 www.symantec.com” 
 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log  
2 
16 An application logs keystrokes that a user typed into Windows. 
 
More Detail:  
[appendix A: 7. Keylogger] 
 Detection : 
System safety monitor’s log 
3 
17 An application captures the screen 
 
Detection : 
- 
2 
18 An application opens unusual/unexpected ports on the machine. 
 
More detail: 
     Considering ports as unusual ports is upon environment of a 
network. For example, in a web server farm network, port number 
80 is a usual port. On the other hand, this port can be considered 
as an unusual port if it appears in a user network group. 
     In this work, MLAS will be implemented on a user network 
group, so server ports such as http, ftp, SMTP, etc. will be 
considered as unusual ports. 
Detection : 
Windows Event log ->security log 
The Port Reporter’s log 
2 
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19 An application adds new accounts. 
 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
3 
20 An application serves as a server such as an HTTP proxy or a 
SMTP relay. 
 
Detection:  
Windows Event log>security log 
3 
21 An application adds entries to  
• the file Win.ini in the lines containing keywords "load=" 
and "run=" 
• the file System.ini in the lines containing a keyword 
"shell=" 
 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
2 
22 An application reads Windows system’s information 
 
Detection : 
Windows Event Log> security log 
1 
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CHAPTER VI 
MLAS APPLICATION DESIGN 
 
 
Log file format 
Event report 
File name format 
MLAS_EVENT_REPORT[date].HTM 
Report format 
[IP1] 
[detected event1] 
[event1 detail] 
[detected event2] 
[event2 detail] 
[more events] 
[IP2] 
[detected event1] 
[event1 detail] 
[detected event2] 
[event2 detail] 
 [more events] 
  [more IPs] 
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Summary Report  
File name format 
MLAS_SUMMARY_REPORT[date].HTM 
Report format 
[IP1] 
[process1] 
[process1’s total weight] 
[process2] 
[process2’s total weight] 
 [more processes] 
[IP2] 
[process1] 
[process1’s total weight] 
[process2] 
[process2’s total weight] 
 [more processes] 
  [more IPs] 
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Process flow 
 
Figure 10 Process flow of LinkCheckEngine, WeightingEngine, and LogFileParsingEngine 
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events with criteria 
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machine’s IP)
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Figure 11 Process flow of BehaviorComparingEngine 
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EventReport
List all detected 
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List monitored 
machines
Generate event 
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machines
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Generate 
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Figure 12 Process flow of ReportGenerationEngine 
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Database schema 
Table III TABLE_AND_LOG_FILE_MAPPING 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
TABLE_NAME VARCHAR2(100) No 1 
FILE_NAME VARCHAR2(1000) No 2 
SEPARATOR VARCHAR2(100) No -  
BEGIN_AT_LINE NUMBER No -  
DATE_FORMAT VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
 
Table IV TABLE_SCHEMA 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
TABLE_NAME VARCHAR2(1000) No 1 
ATTRIBUTE_NAME VARCHAR2(1000) No 2 
ATTRIBUTE_ORDER NUMBER No -  
ATTRIBUTE_TYPE VARCHAR2(1000) No -  
 
Table V EVENT_LOG 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
ID NUMBER No 1 
IP VARCHAR2(100) No 2  
LOG_TYPE VARCHAR2(100) No -  
LOG_TIME DATE No -  
EVENT_ID VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
USER_NAME VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
GROUP_NAME VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
EVENT_TYPE VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
DESCRIPTION VARCHAR2(1000) Yes -  
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Table VI TRAFFIC_LOG 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
ID NUMBER No 1  
IP VARCHAR2(100) No 2  
LOG_TIME DATE No -  
PROTOCAL VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
LOCAL_PORT VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
LOCAL_IP VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
REMOTE_PORT VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
REMOTE_IP VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
PID VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
PROCESS_NAME VARCHAR2(100) Yes -  
USER_NAME VARCHAR2(500) Yes -  
 
Table VII ROOTKIT_REPORT 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
ID NUMBER No 1  
IP VARCHAR2(100) No 2  
REPORT_TIME DATE No -  
HIDDEN_OBJECT_TYPE VARCHAR2(100) No -  
HIDDEN_OBJECT_NAME VARCHAR2(600) No -  
 
Table VIII DETECTING_LOG 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
ID NUMBER No 1 
IP VARCHAR2(100) No 2 
DETECTING_TIME DATE Yes -  
PROCESS_ACTIVITY_NAME VARCHAR2(500) Yes -  
SCORE NUMBER Yes -  
FROM_LOG_TABLE VARCHAR2(500) Yes -  
FROM_LOG_ID NUMBER Yes -  
PROCESS_NAME VARCHAR2(1000) Yes -  
 
Table IX BLACK_PORT_NUMBER 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
PORT_NUMBER VARCHAR2(50) No 1 
 
Table X MONITORING_SERVICE_NAME 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
SERVICE_NAME VARCHAR2(500) No 1 
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Table XI BLACK_PORT_NUMBER 
Column Name Data Type Nullable Primary Key 
PORT_NUMBER VARCHAR2(50) No 1 
 
Table XII APPLICATION_PARAMETER 
Column Name Data Type Nul lable Primary Key 
PARAMETER_NAME VARCHAR2(4000) No 1 
DETECTING_PERIOD NUMBER No -  
ENABLE NUMBER Yes -  
  
Table XIII DLL_INJECTION_LOG 
Column Name Data Type Nul lable Primary Key 
ID NUMBER No 1  
IP VARCHAR2(100) No 2  
LOG_TIME DATE Yes -  
EVENT_TYPE VARCHAR2(10) Yes -  
EVENT_ACTION VARCHAR2(10) Yes -  
USER_NAME VARCHAR2(500) Yes -  
PARENT VARCHAR2(500) Yes -  
CHILD VARCHAR2(500) Yes -  
RESULT VARCHAR2(500) Yes -  
  
Table XIV IP_LIST 
Column Name Data Type Nul lable Primary Key 
IP VARCHAR2(100) No 1 
ENABLE NUMBER Yes -  
  
Table XV WEIGHT_OF_PROCESS_ACTIVITIES 
Column Name Data Type Nul lable Primary Key 
PROCESS_ACTIVITY_NAME VARCHAR2(200) No 1  
WEIGHT NUMBER No -  
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CHAPTER VII 
IMPLEMENTATION, EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS 
 
 
Limitation 
This experiment is applied to Windows XP and the similar OS architecture. 
 
Figure 13 MLAS network diagram
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Applications run on the machines 
The VICTIM machine and the NEIGHBOR machine 
• Enable security audit for these objects 
 A system32 directory following policy: audit this folder only for creating 
files 
 A program file directory following policy: audit this folder and sub for 
creating directory 
 A windows directory following policy: audit this folder only for creating 
files 
 Files hosts, system.ini, and win.ini following policy: audit this object only 
for writing data 
• Run the Lasso for collecting Windows event log, which is binary data, to a 
text file.  
• Run the Port Reporter for logging data traffic generated from local machine to 
remote machine. 
• Run System Safety Monitor for real-time monitoring inter-process activities 
• Schedule the RootkitBuster to run everyday. It will scan a local machine to 
find hidden files, hidden registry and hidden process. Then generate a log file 
• Schedule LogFileParsing, a module in LMS, to parse these log files and store 
data into database. It will be run everyday. 
The NW MONITOR machine 
• Install Snort (with oracle supported option) and run as NIDS. Its alerts will be 
logged into the database 
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The ATTACKER machine 
• Contain backdoor Trojan clients and servers for exploit the victim machine. 
Below is the list of backdoor Trojans, which were tested in experiments. 
 Assasin 2.0 Final 
 Beast 2.07 
 CIA 1.23 Pb1 
 Minimo Public 0.7 
 ProRat V1.9  
 SubSeven V.2.1.5 
 
Application configuration and testing steps 
[Appendix B: Application configuration and testing steps]
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Experimental results 
The Normal activities case 
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Figure 15 Process name-weight  graph
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Results analysis 
Weighting 
Table XVI Process activities and weight 
PROCESS_ACTIVITY_NAME WEIGHT 
C1SavingFileIntoSystemFolder 2 
C2RegisteringAsStartupProcess 1 
C3ModifyingConfigOfWindowsMonitorTools 2 
C4AddingBrowserHelper 2 
C5SendingInfoViaChatApp 2 
C6DLLInjection 2 
C7CheckLink 3 
C8HiddingItself 2 
C9CheckAttackingNeighbors 3 
C10ConnectingIRCServer 3 
C11AccessingPasswordFile 3 
C12Spamming 3 
C14KillingOrDisablingSystemMonitoringTools 3 
C15ModifyingHostsFile 2 
C16LowLevelKeyboardAccess 3 
C18OpeningPort 2 
C19CreatingUserAccount 3 
C20ServingAsServer 3 
C21ModifyingWinIni_SystemIniFile 2 
C22ReadSystemInformation 1 
 
1. From the case Normal Activities we can see C2, C3, C6 and C18 are the general 
activities. We should give them less weight than others. At the first round of 
analysis, we give these process activities weight 1. In case of C3, C6 and C18, 
however, they can be the serious situations, which are harmful to the machine. We 
increase their weight to 2. 
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2. C7, C9, C10, C12, C14, C16 and C20 are identified as backdoor behaviors. These 
activities will not appear in the case Normal Activities whereas they will be 
detected sometimes in later Trojan test cases, so we give them weight 3. 
3. C5 should be seen in the case Normal Activities because chat applications such as 
ICQ, MSN or AIM are popular programs, which many people use frequently. 
This process activity is hard to be detected because chat service providers’ 
servers, ports or login approaches are often changed upon application version and 
manual configuration of each user. In case of C8, we can detect some system 
files, system processes or system registries hiding themselves in order to protect 
them from innocent users who try to modify or delete them without enough 
knowledge. However, both process activities are the part of backdoor Trojan 
behavior. We assign their weight to 2. 
4. From considering the process activities C1, C4, C11, C19 and C21, Trojans use 
these activities to install and escalate themselves to get more privilege. We assign 
their weight 3. However, in the case Normal Activities, these activities can be 
found in some kinds of applications; for example, installing toolbars is a cause of 
meeting C4, or the process “msiexec.exe”, which is used to install new programs 
that use Windows Installer package files, may have to access system objects such 
as Windows directory, system32 directory, win.ini and system.ini. Therefore, we 
change the weight of C1, C4 and C21 to 2 
5. Finally, a machine’s system information is an important thing for knowing its 
platform, service pack version, host name, etc. Attackers want to know it before 
they exploit a system. However, this kind of activity can be detected in normal 
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applications especially in reading system information. So, we assign weight of 
C22 to 1 and C15 to 2 because of lower detecting frequency 
 
Threshold of process weight 
The Normal activities case 
The average of the normal process score: 820/30 = 27.3 
The maximum process activities found in normal processes: 3 
Top 3 process activities met in normal processes: C2, C3 and C18 
The sum score of top 3 process activities: 50 
 
The Trojan case 
The average of the normal process score: 860/31 = 27.7 
The maximum process activities found in normal processes: 3 
Top 3 process activities met in normal processes: C1, C6 and C18 
The sum weight of top 3 process activities: 60 
The average of the backdoor Trojan process score: 810/6 = 135 
The minimum process activities found in Trojan processes: 5 
Top 5 process activities met in the backdoor Trojan processes: C1, C5, C6, 
C14 and C18 
The sum weight of top 5 process activities: 110 
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Result 
For the maximum threshold value of the normal process, I consider the top 
3 process activities in the normal activities case because when I tested the 
Trojan case, some of correlative processes of a Trojan process appeared and 
could deviate the process weight. 
Table XVII Threshold score 
Score range Result 
 Below 50 A normal process 
51-109 A suspect process 
Above 110 A backdoor Trojan process 
 
If any machine contains a suspect process, they should be inspected closely. 
They may or may not be infected with a backdoor Trojan because MLAS contains 
a false positive alarm (more detail below). If any machine contains a process 
having a weight over 110, they are considered a victim of backdoor Trojans. In 
this case, administrators should quarantine them from the network and find the 
way to end them 
 
Null process 
Some process activities cannot be determined by the process name. For 
instance, attacking neighbors is detected by Snort. Because Snort doesn’t provide 
information about process names, which create the attacking connection, MLAS 
cannot identify the process names. In case of processes hiding themselves, 
Windows event log sometimes cannot see them, so we cannot determine the 
process name either.  
Because the weight isn’t counted into any process name, these process 
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activities can only be detected by looking at the level of the machine’s IP and. 
Then, when administrators consider the threshold of process weight, we should 
add this weight into the process weight as well 
 
False positive alarm 
From the result in the Normal activities case, regedit.exe, svchost.exe, 
msiexec.exe and null process name were considered as false positive alarms. 
Their weights were considered as suspect processes but actually this false positive 
was caused by special activities made by administrators or by the machine’s 
normal process behavior. 
“regedit.exe” was created by administrators who wanted to check data inside 
Windows registry. This kind of activity can occur anytime when administrators 
notice something wrong in the system and want to check data inside the registry. 
So, if there are similar activities made by authorized users, the false positive 
alarm will occur and it can be ignored. 
The process “svchost.exe” and “msiexec.exe” can create the false positive 
alarm because of their normal process behavior. The process svchost.exe is used 
to manage the local system and interoperate with other processes. Moreover, it 
has to open ports for receiving requests from other machines or processes. One 
solution we found for reducing a false positive alarm of this process is learning 
the process behavior about the opening ports frequently and safely. MLAS 
provides white-port tuning that allows administrators to tell the system what the 
safe ports are. The processes can open these ports without alerting process activity 
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C18.  
The process msiexec.exe is a broker process used to install new programs that 
use Windows Installer package files (MSI). It accesses the system object instead 
of the real process. Because of this, its weight can be raised to the level of the 
suspect process. When administrators found this kind of process, they should take 
care of these processes separately. 
 
Problems 
1. The URL checking website, LinkScanner, has a limitation of the number of 
connections. So if MLAS send many requests over its limitation, the system 
will get a timeout error and have to wait until the scanner accept connections 
again. 
2. The process activities C8 and C22 are difficult to be detected because there 
are many ways to achieve these activities. MLAS cannot cover every 
approach, so from the experimental result, MLAS couldn’t detect C8 and C22. 
3. Currently, there is no precise approach to detecting keyloggers. MLAS tries to 
monitor accessing low level of keyboard to detect the process activities C16 
even though it’s not the best way. From the experiment, MLAS can detect 
these process activities in some Trojans, but not all of them. 
4. The System Safety Monitor software I tried, which is used in MLAS, is a trial 
version and will be expired if I don’t buy a license extension. I tried to test the 
free version of this application but it didn’t provide as many features as I 
needed. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
 MLAS is developed in order to detect backdoor Trojans at zero day or unknown 
backdoor Trojans. It uses the new technique called multiple logs analysis that analyzes 
log data collected by many monitoring tools. The Project Lasso collects security audit 
events and process activities from Windows Event Log. The System Safety Monitor 
records inter-process activities. Communication activities are captured by the Port 
Reporter and send remote IPs to LinkScanner and McAfee SiteAdvisor to check their 
harmfulness. The Sophos rootkit scanner is used to detect hidden processes and hidden 
files on a local machine. Also, Snort monitors traffic on a computer network and logs 
abnormal connections to the Oracle database server.  
MLAS can detect the Trojan processes by looking at the total weight of process. 
A process having weight more than the threshold will be determined to be a Trojan 
process. From the experimental results, MLAS can detect each of six Trojan processes, 
which have the distinctive high process weight. Moreover, any suspect process will be 
detected by MLAS using the second threshold comparison. 
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MLAS can be improved to deploy on many kinds of operating systems. Because 
nowadays the operating systems are varied widely, developing MLAS in the first phase is 
based on Windows XP and other operating systems that have the same architecture. If 
you want to deploy MLAS on other systems, it should be adapted in some of the process 
activity detection approaches such as the location of system objects and monitoring tools 
compatibility. Moreover, emerging of new tools can improve MLAS in case of process 
activity detection. This problem can be seen in MLAS. It cannot find a tools or a way to 
detect an event, which meets the process activities in the list. Or it can just detect the side 
effect of the event that can create the false decision. Finally, computer security 
experience in auditing systems is necessary for MLAS as well. The better auditing can 
catch more events relating to process activities in the list. 
The concept and framework of MLAS can be used to detect other kinds of 
malware on computer systems other than zero-day backdoor Trojans. It is able to study 
the malware’s behavior, create new list of process activities and find appropriate tools to 
detect process activities’ event. In the future, MLAS may become to a new powerful 
monitoring tool because of its effective framework and improved human knowledge. 
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APPENDIX A: 
1. Startup registry keys and startup folders 
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Currentcontrolset\Services 
to create a Trojan process as a service. 
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
Run\ and 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
RunOnce 
to create Trojan processes as background services when the logon dialog box 
first appears, or at this stage of the boot process only once per boot. 
• KEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Run 
to run Trojan processes each time a new user logs in. 
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run 
to start Trojan processes when Windows starts up. 
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\ 
WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify 
Windows will notify Trojan processes to be run when a logon event occurs. 
• HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Exefile\shell\open\command  
Key name: (Default) 
Key value: "%1" %* 
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If value of “(Default)” key is changed to {%Trojan path% /exec:"%1" %*}, 
The Trojan will be automatically invoked when file type “exe” is called. Trojans 
can deal with other file type such as JPEG 
(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Jpegfile\Shell\Open\Command  
"(Default)" = %Trojan path% /exec:%interpreter%). 
• C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\ Programs\Startup 
A startup folder contains processes that the user wants to run at Windows 
startup. 
 
2. Windows monitor tools’ configuration registry keys 
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Security Center  
to modify configuration of a Windows security monitor tool.  
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Wind
owsUpdate\auto update 
to modify configuration of a Windows update service. 
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\Do
mainProfile 
to modify configuration of Windows Firewall application 
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\
Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List 
A list of applications that can be passed through firewall. 
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3. Browser Helper Object 
A "Browser Helper Object (BHO)" is a DLL that works with Internet Explorer for 
some special purpose. BHOs can be installed on machines for being supplement toolbars 
of the Internet Explorer application. They may or may not require user interface or users’ 
permission for installing. So, they can reside in any machines without users’ awareness. 
Trojans use this kind of DLL to monitor and gather information of users when they’re 
surfing 
 
4. Ports and login servers for sending machine’s information 
Destination port 
• SMTP: TCP 25, 465 
• MSN Messenger: TCP 1863 
• Yahoo! Messenger: TCP 80 
• ICQ: UDP 2000-4000, TCP 5190 
• AOL Instant Messenger: TCP 5190 
Login server 
• AOL Instant Messenger: login.oscar.aol.com:443, login.oscar.aol.com, 
toc.oscar.aol.com and login.icq.com 
• MSN Messenger: gateway.messenger.hotmail.com 
• ICQ: login.icq.com and http.proxy.icq.com 
• Yahoo! Messenger: msg.edit.yahoo.com/* 
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5. DLL injection 
A Dynamically Linked Library (DLL) is a shared library, to which many 
processes can access. DLLs provide common functions that processes don’t have to 
reproduce for their own. When any processes want to use DLLs, they load the DLLs into 
their virtual address space and call functions inside the loaded DLLs 
DLL injection is inserting code into a program’s memory space. It can be 
achieved by many approaches. The popular approach has the following steps:  
• Start a process 
• Create a DLL 
• Open a target process 
• Load the DLL into reserved virtual address space of the target process 
• Create a remote thread inside the target process to run the loaded DLL 
 
Figure 16 A process injects a DLL into a target process and  
creates a remote thread inside the target process [18] 
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For malicious applications, the objective of this activity is avoiding firewall 
detection. When a malicious process wants to communicate with an attacker, it creates a 
remote thread in a trusted process and uses this process name to bypass the firewall. 
 
Figure 17 A malicious process is bloceked from a firewall [19] 
 
 
Figure 18 A malicious process inject a DLL into  
a trusted process for bypass firewall detection [19] 
 
6. Rootkit 
Definition of a rootkit 
59  
A rootkit is a program or set of programs that an intruder uses to hide their 
presence on a computer system and to allow access to the computer system in the 
future. To accomplish its goal, a rootkit will alter the execution flow of the 
operating system or manipulate the data set that the operating system relies upon 
for auditing and bookkeeping [20].  
 
How does the Rootkit work? 
The Rootkit processes run in a low level mode, which can intercept 
applications’ call to the operating system and modify the result sent back to the 
applications. For example, when an user runs the Task manager for monitor 
running processes, the task manager makes a system call to the operating system 
for retrieving a list of running processes. The Rootkit intercepts this system call 
and delete its own process name in the list returned to the Task manager. So, the 
user cannot see the Rootkit process. From this kind of activity, the Rootkit can 
hide its existence such as communication ports, files and registries [21]. 
 
7. Keylogger 
The Keylogger is a program used to keep track of information that a user typed in 
any application and save it into a file, which is usually encrypted and hidden from the 
user. It can log any important information such as credit card numbers, username and 
password. It may be detected by checking low level access of keyboard of a process. 
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APPENDIX B: Application configuration and testing steps 
1. Application configuration 
The MLAS machine 
The BehaviorComparingEngine task schedule 
 
Figure 19 BehaviorComparingEngine task schedule 
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The ReportGenerationEngine task schedule 
 
Figure 20 ReportGenerationEngine task schedule 
The batch files 
behaviorComparingEngineBatch.bat  
cd C:\MLAS\app 
java BehaviorComparingEngine > app.log 
reportGenerationEngineBatch.bat 
  cd C:\MLAS\app 
java ReportGenerationEngine 
 
Oracle Database Server 
Database Setting  
Oracle Database 10g Express Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 - Product  
PL/SQL Release 10.2.0.1.0 - Production  
CORE 10.2.0.1.0 Production  
TNS for 32-bit Windows: Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production  
NLSRTL Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production  
dbname: XE 
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user: sinchai 
password: JfNkK852 
user:snort 
password: JfNkK852 
 
The VICTIM machine and the NEIGHBOR machine 
Security audit  
1. Explorer>Tools>View: deselects “Use simple file sharing” 
 
Figure 21 Use simple file sharing option 
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2. [Audit Object]>Sharing and Security>Security 
 
Figure 22 Security tab 
64  
3. Advance>Audit 
 
Figure 23 Audit tab 
4. Add: Everyone 
 
Figure 24 User selection window 
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5. OK>selects or deselects desired events 
 
Figure 25 Object event audit tab 
6. set the configuration 
Table XVIII Object audit configuration 
Audited object Audit apply to Audited event 
system32 this folder only create file 
program file this folder and 
subfolders 
create dir 
windows this folder only create file 
hosts, system.ini, win.ini this object only write data 
append data 
write attr 
write atten attr 
change permission 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM this object only All 
C:\WINDOWS\repair\sam this object only All 
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HCU\Software\Microsoft\ 
Protected Storage System Provider 
this key and 
subkeys 
All 
Documents and Settings\Application Data\ 
Microsoft\Credentials 
this folder and 
subfolders 
All 
HCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ 
IntelliForms\Storage2 
this key and 
subkeys 
All 
C:\Documents and Settings\KARAWUT\ 
Application Data\Microsoft\Address Book 
this folder and 
subfolders 
read data 
HLM \software\microsoft\windows nt\ 
currentVersion 
this key only query value 
HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Policies\System 
this key only set value 
HLM\System\Currentcontrolset\Services\ this key only create subkey 
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Run[Services] 
this key only set value 
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Run[Services]Once 
this key only set value 
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Run[Services]OnceEx 
this key only set value 
HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Run 
this key only set value 
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run 
this key only set value 
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT 
CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify 
this key only create subkey 
HCR\Exefile\shell\open\command\ this key only set value 
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start 
Menu\ Programs\Startup 
this folder only write data, append 
data 
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Security Center this key and 
subkeys 
set value 
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\auto update 
this key set value 
HLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\ 
WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile 
this key and 
subkeys 
set value, create 
sub 
HLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ 
SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\ 
StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List 
this key only set value 
HLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\Explorer\ 
Browser Helper Objects 
this key and 
subkeys 
create subkey 
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Project Lasso 
The configuration file “Lasso.ini” 
SkipInitDLLScan,0 
LogAppliance,127.0.0.1,514 
RepositoryPath,C:\Program Files\Lasso\LassoRepository\ 
SpoolPath,C:\Program Files\Lasso\LassoRepository\Spool\ 
EventPollInterval,10 
SpoolFileSize,0.01 # spool file size in % 
WatermarkWriteInterval,100 
MaxTraceFileSize,1 
MaxNumWorkerThreads,4 
DllLoadInterval,3600 
HighWaterMarks,ON 
#DefaultLassoShare,LassoShare=C:\LassoTemp 
CheckHostListInterval,3600 
NewHostSkipHistorical,0 
EnableShareDlls,1 
CheckRemHostAvail,0 
EnableAdminSharesIfDisabled,0 
DebugLevel,31 
LogLevel,7 
DebugHostFileSize,10 #  VICTIM#0 SIZE 
AccessReport,0 
The configuration file Hostlist.ini 
  localhost,security,system 
The directory structure 
 
Figure 26 Lasso's directory structure 
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The startup process 
 
Figure 27 Lasso's startup process 
 
The Port Reporter 
The directory structure 
 
Figure 28 Port Reporter's directory structure 
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The startup service 
 
Figure 29 Port Reporter's startup service 
 
System safety monitor 
Application configuration 
 General configuration 
 
Figure 30 System Safety Monitor's general configuration 
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  Logging configuration 
 
Figure 31 System Safety Monitor's logging configuration 
  Applications configuration 
 
Figure 32 System Safety Monitor's applications configuration 
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Rule configuration: everything is default except “Rules>Process 
control>Terminate other processes” 
 
Figure 33 System Safety Monitor's rule configuration 
The directory structure 
 
Figure 34 System Safety Monitor's directory structure 
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LogFileParsing 
Command 
java LogFileParsing > app.log 
Task schedule 
 
Figure 35 LogFileParsing's task schedule 
Batch files 
lasso.bat 
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt 
copy /Y C:\"Program Files"\Lasso\LassoRepository\Spool\VICTIM#0.txt 
C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt 
 
dllInjection.bat 
cd C:\Program Files\System Safety Monitor\log 
for /F "tokens=5 skip=5" %%A IN ('dir /O-D *.xml') DO ( 
  copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\logs\dllInjectionLog.xml 
  copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\oldLog\ 
  del /Q %%A 
) 
portReporter.bat 
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt 
copy /Y C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\pr-ports* 
C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt 
del /Q C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\* 
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rootKitBuster.bat  
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\RootkitBuster.txt 
del /Q C:\"Program Files"\RootkitBuster\TMRBLog\* 
cd C:\"Program Files"\RootkitBuster 
RootkitBuster.exe /s /a 
copy /Y C:\"Program Files"\RootkitBuster\TMRBLog\TMRB00001.TXT 
C:\batchJob\logs\RootkitBuster.txt 
 
sophosRootkit.bat 
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt 
cd C:\Program Files\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Rootkit 
sarcli -log="C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt" 
logCollector.bat 
cd C:\batchJob\app 
java LogFileParsing > app.log 
 
The NW MONITOR machine 
Snort (with oracle supported option) 
Command 
snort -de -i3 -l ..\log -h 10.0.0.0/24 -c ..\etc\snort.conf 
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Configuration for Oracle supported 
 
Figure 36 Snort's configuration for Oracle supported 
The startup process 
 
Figure 37 Snort's startup process 
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Backdoor Trojan Removal 
In case of detecting unknown backdoor Trojan, Snort was removed the rule 
for detecting Trojans. 
 
Switch 
Switch configuration: Port monitoring 
 
Figure 38 Switch configuration 
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Figure 39 Port monitoring page 
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2. Testing steps 
1. create a Trojan server on the machine ATTACKER 
 
Figure 40 setting installation path 
 
 
Figure 41 Setting autostart 
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Figure 42 Setting notification 
 
 
Figure 43 setting keylogger 
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Figure 44 Setting process termination 
 
2. connect to the VICTIM 
 
Figure 45 Connecting to the VICTIM 
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3. Controls the VICTIM 
 
Figure 46 Controlling the VICTIM 
 
Figure 47 Controlling the VICTIM 
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Figure 48 Retrieving the VICTIM's processes 
 
4. Run test.bat on the machine VICTIM 
cd C:\Program Files\System Safety Monitor\log 
for /F "tokens=5 skip=5" %%A IN ('dir /O-D *.xml') DO ( 
 copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\logs\dllInjectionLog.xml 
 copy /Y %%A C:\batchJob\oldLog\ 
 del /Q %%A 
) 
 
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt 
copy /Y C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\pr-ports* 
C:\batchJob\logs\portReporter.txt 
del /Q C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\PortReporter\* 
 
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt 
cd C:\Program Files\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Rootkit 
sarcli -proc -log="C:\batchJob\logs\sophosRootkit.txt" 
 
del /Q C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt 
copy /Y C:\"Program Files"\Lasso\LassoRepository\Spool\VICTIM#0.txt 
C:\batchJob\logs\lasso.txt 
 
cd C:\batchJob\app 
java LogFileParsing > app.log 
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5. run behaviorComparingEngineBatch.bat on the machine MLAS 
6. runs reportGenerationEngineBatch.bat on the machine 
7. Two reports generated from ReportGenerationEngine will be in the same 
directory with ReportGenerationEngine 
